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Introduction to the Special Issue on the Future of Legal Gender: 
Exploring the Feminist Politics of Decertification 
 
Davina Cooper, Emily Grabham, Flora Renz* 
 
What might be the consequences if the state no longer legally classified people as female 
or male based on a sex registered at birth? We call this the “decertification” question. 
Decertification refers to a situation in which state law steps back from recording, 
confirming, recognising, or standing behind sex/ gender1 as formally attributed aspects 
of personhood.  It is a question that lies at the heart of our ESRC-funded project on the 
Future of Legal Gender (FLaG), which began in May 2018.2  
Our exploration of decertification is a response to two developments and one 
enduring feature of contemporary neoliberal countries, such as Britain. The two 
developments are the move towards legislative convergence in how men and women 
are formally treated in legislation (substantive gender-neutrality) and the growing 
recognition, by public and other bodies, of people’s self-described gender identities. The 
enduring feature is the gendered character and asymmetries of social and institutional 
life. This gendered character is not fixed; nevertheless, gender remains an organising 
 
* Davina Cooper: Research Professor in Law, Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, UK; email 
davina.cooper@kcl.ac.uk. Emily Grabham: Professor of Law, Kent Law School, University of Kent, UK; email 
E.Grabham@kent.ac.uk. Flora Renz: Lecturer in Law, Kent Law School, University of Kent, UK; email 
F.Renz@kent.ac.uk.  
1 The currently contested language of sex and gender makes usage of both terms difficult as there is no basic 
consensus among critical activists and scholars. This research project foregrounds gender as a sociological 
concept that gives “sex” meaning, authority, and shape. FLaG recognises that different bodily qualities and 
attributes, including reproductive ones, contribute to how life is experienced, including through forms of 
oppression. The FLaG project also recognises how “sex” has come to function as a political and legal resource 
(some would say weapon) in the struggle to assert binary and immutable bodily differences. Engaging with 
these usages, the project takes account of other research that questions the notion of coherent and fixed 
sexual difference. This latter research suggests that the qualities identified as making up the assemblage “sex” 
are provisional and changing, with social and technological processes combining with biological ones in ways 
that cannot be easily or usefully separated; that sex itself does not take a binary form; and that other bodily 
qualities (not conventionally aligned with sex) may, in different contexts, be more significant in shaping how 
social life is experienced.  
2 Alongside us, other project members are co-investigator, Elizabeth Peel, and research associates Robyn 
Emerton and Hannah Newman. The project ends on 31 March 2022. 






principle of society-making processes, giving rise to distinctly patterned norms, 
practices, and unequal social relations. Given the conjuncture of these three trends, 
FLaG asks: is state withdrawal from formally registering, establishing, and assigning 
sex/ gender as an attribute of legal personhood an overdue reform? Might 
decertification liberate people from the strictures of state-enforced sex/ gender? Or is it, 
instead, a form of privatisation, withdrawing state responsibility for remedying 
gendered inequalities?  
 This special issue explores these questions, drawing on research from the FLaG 
project. In this brief introduction, we sketch three key pillars of the research - gender, 
law, and prefiguration. These provide foundations but also directions for the discussion 
that follows. We then introduce the five articles, each of which is followed by responses 
from two interlocutors. All the papers were initially presented at a colloquium at King’s 
College London in June 2019. We are very grateful to our discussants for their generous 
engagement. Listed in the order they appear in this special issue, they are Ruth Fletcher, 
Ambreena Manji, Christine Quinan, Jennifer Fraser, Kath Browne, Shona Hunter, Sumi 
Madhok, Vanessa Munro, Alain Pottage, and Helen Xanthaki. We should stress that, at 
this stage of the project, our aim is not to draw definitive conclusions about 
decertification but to elicit discussion around some developing lines of analysis. These 
have coalesced around four primary research strands: exploring what decertification 
entails; addressing its implications for equality agendas, and for single-sex provision, in 
particular; exploring the craft and implications of statutory drafting for enacting new 
formalised gender settlements; and understanding wider public attitudes and feelings 
about legal reform. Research on these four themes has involved over one hundred semi-
structured interviews with service providers, municipal equality officers, lawyers and 
legal experts, government officials, trade unionists, school staff, NGO workers, sports 
and care sector workers, and members of different publics. In this special issue, we also 
draw on findings from a project survey that took place in the autumn of 2018, which 
generated over 3,000 responses (including over 1,000 qualitative responses as Peel and 
Newman, this issue, discuss). In addition, our analysis has benefited from comments, 
questions, discussions, and conversations across a range of fora, including public 
lectures, seminars and workshops with NGO and public sector staff, activists, academics, 
students, and others.   







 The articles that follow explore different dimensions of decertification, and the 
reactions it has elicited. However, we should stress that FLaG is not an advocacy project. 
In this special issue, we do not argue for the state’s withdrawal from registering, 
confirming, or assigning sex/ gender. Nevertheless, decertification characterises a 
reform pathway that is gaining relevance and force. In Tasmania, Australia, the legal 
introduction in 2019 of an “opt-in” approach means birth certificates no longer record 
sex unless applicants specifically request it. Momentum for reform can also be seen in 
many governments’ formal or informal acceptance of people’s self-identified gender. 
While this has tended to be limited to two categories: female and male (women and 
men), third gender categories are also emerging – officially, informally, and somewhere 
in between – across a range of jurisdictions, making it likely that more governments will 
introduce law and policy in this direction (or at least consider it) over the coming years. 
Together, these changes suggest that understanding some of the stakes, concerns, and 
implications of decertification for gender, law, and community decision-making and 
practice is important and timely.  
The first direction that FLaG faces is gender. This special issue traces the stakes 
and implications of different conceptions of gender. The conflict between sex-based 
rights advocacy and identity-based approaches to gender has come to dominate the 
political landscape; with the FLaG project also sometimes caught in the crossfire. Given 
the tendency for public discussion and governmental discourse to understand gender 
through existing tropes of intelligibility, such as rights, interests, identities, selfhood, 
and groups, it is unsurprising that this division has monopolised debate. However, 
retaining a broader sense of the choices, divisions, and possibilities for gender politics is 
crucial – that there is more at stake than whether sexes/ genders are two or multiple; 
whether they are felt, chosen or imposed; and whether personal gender claims should 
be affirmed or resisted. Questions that have emerged in our research foreground 
conceptual, strategic, temporal, and normative concerns – from questions about 
gender’s meaning and location (in bodies, discourse, social structures), to how gender 
relates to other social relations (including race, class, and disability), to understanding 
gender’s affects (including its harms and pleasures), to the political ambitions of social 
forces (for liberation, the meeting of needs and interests, new forms of subjectivity, or 
new worlds), to modes of political engagement (through policy, law reform, grass-roots 






activism, prefigurative projects), to the relationship between present strategies and 
other times (is the present a site where past inequalities must be countered, a space for 
imagining and enacting future hopes, or something else)?  
As a research project that is both critical and feminist, FLaG seeks to put these 
different questions and approaches into dialogue with each other as it carves out a 
space of inquiry that refuses to track current divisions.  Our analysis departs from 
narrations of gender that treat it as a property of subjects, as well as from narrations 
which understand it as a monolithic force imposed on sexed bodies. Instead, we focus 
on conceptual accounts that foreground gender as a social phenomenon, shaped and 
rendered intelligible by other institutional features and relations, including capitalist 
and racialised globalisation processes. Gender’s asymmetrical patterning affects bodies 
and subjects (even as it is also taken up and reworked by subjects). But gender also, 
importantly, contributes to how other institutions and aspects of social life are 
organised: from schools and sports to parliament, local government, and law. This social 
account of gender has been well-established in many areas of feminist scholarship; 
however, it has been passed over in recent conversations due to a growing tendency to 
approach gender as something that is subject-shaped – whether as an identity that 
people take up and give form to, or as something imposed on sexed bodies. At the same 
time, the articles in this special issue remain attentive to gender as a site of attachment, 
community, innovation, and dissent. Gender may be claimed as a source of hierarchical 
power and control – highlighting what can be done to others because of the gender that 
one has (a gender that may also be forged through what is done to others). But gender is 
also claimed by people seeking to make lives in gendered society liveable, to advance 
radical political projects, and as a source of meaning that may outlive its currently 
coded hierarchy.  
Different forms of contemporary and hopeful attachment sometimes jostle, and 
sometimes coincide, with relations of gendered detachment – from collective projects 
directed towards gender’s abolition to personal attempts to live without a gender 
identity. FLaG grapples with these issues, holding open for analysis questions already 
circulating such as whether gender should be abandoned or revised and whether the 
two may converge in conditions where revisions are so significant that gender in its 







current form no longer exists. These are also questions on which contributors to this 
special issue diverge. This collection of articles and commentaries collectively explores 
critical and interdisciplinary approaches to the future of legal gender, but they do not 
take a single common path. Instead, the contributions forge tracks that diverge, fuse, 
and cross over each other, as they trace different approaches to gender’s meaning, 
presence, normativity, and hoped-for futures.  
 The second direction that FLaG faces is law. Feminist scholarship has been 
hugely influential in analysing law’s work in maintaining gendered relations of 
subordination, exploitation, and disadvantage. This work has focused primarily on 
women as the subordinated category, subject position, and class of concern, although 
more recently work has expanded to include other subordinated or marginalised 
gender statuses (and identities). This special issue aims to contribute to feminist legal 
scholarship, and particularly to work that critically interrogates law’s efforts and 
capacity to lessen gender-based inequalities. In many respects, our focus on 
decertification might appear to be narrow, removing the legal status of one specific 
category: gender/ sex that currently structures legal personhood, and that locates 
people in relation to diverse regulatory and distributive processes: from pensions and 
maternity provisions to single-sex schools and hospital wards. Importantly, 
decertification, as we approach it, would not in itself remove state law from providing a 
formal remedial structure for discrimination on grounds of sex/ gender. What it would 
mean is that such claims would not have, and could not rely upon, a formal legal 
designation as female or male based on birth certificate records. In this way, sex/ 
gender would be placed on a par with other social relations that, in Britain, are not 
currently treated as formalised aspects of personhood by state law, such as sexual 
orientation and race/ethnicity. Given the enduring character of these relations of 
inequality, as well as others, such as class (that are also not recognised as shaping and 
composing legal personhood), we do not assume that decertification would undo the 
hierarchical or asymmetrical ordering work undertaken by governmental and other 
institutional processes when it comes to gender. At the same time, critical exploration of 
decertification poses important questions about the value of law, including anti-
discrimination law, in undoing (or remedying) inequality.  






Feminist legal scholarship has long expressed misgivings about the contribution 
that law and contemporary equality law instruments can make to lessening gender-
based inequalities. From this perspective, the value in retaining formal sex/ gender 
status, as a tool to help tackle gendered inequalities, seems doubtful. Yet, what has also 
emerged from our research is the value that many feminist policymakers, NGOs 
activists, and others accord to law, arguing that it provides important practical tools and 
discursive justifications for countering women’s subordination - even as others argue 
that a more expansive legal gaze is needed to incorporate other vulnerable gendered 
subjects. Within this rocky and uneven legal landscape, our research project explores 
the stakes and anticipated effects of state law abandoning its practice of imposing sex/ 
gender classifications on subjects. Equality law is, unsurprisingly, a central piece of this 
discussion. But the legislative use of gender-based terms (and here we include terms 
such as sex, male, woman, mother, father, same- and opposite sex) embraces a diverse 
range of legal fields and sectors far beyond equality law. Thus, one challenge for this 
project, as a law reform project, is to explore how these different legal areas might be 
reformed if the formal language and status of sex/ gender could no longer be counted 
on.  
 Asking people their views on decertification reveals the value of a proposal such 
as this in bringing people’s attitudes, feelings, and understandings of law and law 
reform into sharp relief. Responses to one specific pathway for legal change 
demonstrate something of people’s hopes and concerns about the future, about gender 
and, also, about law as it is. To explore the legal consciousness of different stakeholders 
and publics towards a proposal that, in Britain, is not yet on the law reform table, even 
as some have felt at times that it might be drawing close, we draw on the political device 
of prefiguration. FLaG is a prefigurative law reform project in several respects. For 
those who advocate it, decertification itself constitutes a prefigurative approach to sex/ 
gender by treating its terms as if they no longer had the human significance necessary 
to warrant registration by the state. But decertification is prefigurative in another 
respect – namely, as a proposal that is addressed in this research project as if it were 
worthy of law reform scrutiny. To prefigure reform in this way allows a legal proposal 
associated with a time ahead to be rehearsed. This makes it possible to explore its 







potential, to identify its limits and challenges and, perhaps, to resolve at least some of 
them thereby easing the proposal’s “proper” arrival on the political agenda.  
It is important, however, not to overstate the value or feasibility of anticipating 
one possible legal future, given the suite of changes that are likely to precede or 
accompany its arrival. What decertification means or looks like in Britain in 2020, as we 
conduct our research, cannot resolve the complexities that its political and legal 
assessment would face at a subsequent date.  At the same time, considering 
decertification now provides an opportunity for some “ground-surveying” (if not 
necessarily “clearing”) – identifying challenges and issues that its formal progression 
would need to address and ideally resolve. But beyond its anticipatory, if critical, 
rehearsal, addressing decertification also allows it to materialise in the present. In other 
words, prefigurative law reform does not simply observe what could be as if it were a 
phantom visitor floating in from another time with no presence in the present. It also 
invites others to engage, interactively and collaboratively, with a law reform proposal, 
taking shape and existing as an academic research project. It is worth stressing that 
whatever consequences or effects this engagement has are unlikely to be those of 
accomplishment (certainly in the short term). Discussing decertification does not, itself, 
bring such a measure into being or even necessarily make its realisation more likely. 
Aside from the fact that FLaG is a project of exploration rather than of advocacy as we 
have said, the authority of an academic project is not the same as that of a government 
department (and even government departments may fail to accomplish the legislative 
programmes they advance). As a result, what our exploration of decertification can and 
will do is shaped – if not determined - by its academic home and register.  At the same 
time, this project takes place in a context where different bodies internationally – 
activist, policy, legal, political, and academic – are exploring sex/ gender deregistration 
reforms. While we do not know, at this stage, where these will lead, FLaG has been 
designed as a reflexive project. And so, in its final stages, we will reflect, explicitly and 
critically, on the relationship of our prefigurative law reform methodology to this 
vibrant, wider political terrain.  
We now turn to the five articles in this special issue. In the first article Pulling the 
thread of decertification:  What challenges are raised by the proposal to reform legal 






gender status Davina Cooper and Robyn Emerton explore the hopes, politics, and 
concerns that decertification raises as a mechanism for de-formalising sex/ gender. The 
article considers decertification, as a speculative reform initiative, in two primary ways. 
First, it asks what contribution, if any, might decertification make to a feminist politics 
intent on undoing gender-based hierarchies. Second, it explores what decertification 
can offer as a methodological research thread that brings certain concerns, issues, and 
hopes into view. Setting decertification alongside an alternative reform strategy of 
legally recognising multiple gender identities, the article explores the feminist benefits 
of decertification; the criticisms it faces; and different ways of responding to feminist 
concerns. Here, the article turns to governmental strategies, such as privacy design and 
risk assessment, already being utilised to address the growing informalisation of sex/ 
gender, and the criticisms that can and have been made of these strategies. It then 
considers decertification’s relationship to more radical political projects intent on 
questioning and unsettling existing orderings. Finally, the article considers the risks of 
androcentrism and gender-neutral law and argues for the need to embed decertification 
within a wider multiplex progressive agenda. 
The next article by Flora Renz focuses on the question of how decertification 
would affect single-sex services. In The challenge of same sex provision: How many girls 
does a girls’ school need?  Renz analyses some early findings from her socio-legal study 
of single-sex schools, drawing on semi-structured interviews with education policy 
experts and head teachers. Renz addresses two interlinked questions about the 
challenges that decertification may pose to the provision of single sex-services 
generally, and education in particular: first, what does gender differentiation aim to 
achieve; and second, how do secondary education providers (and other service 
providers) currently approach the challenges that their differentiation policies face? 
Renz sets out the reasons for single-sex education. She then summarises current legal 
rights, requirements, and debates concerning the inclusion of trans and non-binary 
pupils within single-sex schools, noting how adjustments to uniform policies and 
administrative practices are used as part of an ensemble of approaches that challenge 
gender stereotypes overall rather than focusing on individuals. She explores how ideas 
of ‘community’ and ‘inclusivity’ significantly shape interviewees’ approach to gender 
and its boundaries so that trans and gender non-conforming pupils are understood as 







belonging to the school community.  Presenting schools as a productive example of a 
‘jurisdiction’, in which written gender rules interact with unwritten official practices, 
and a ‘case by case’ approach, schools’ capacity to adapt is highlighted. Renz points to 
the ‘flexible and situational’ understandings of sex and gender that such schools can 
support, but also notes that different schools may take distinct approaches to Equality 
Act requirements. She concludes by returning to a set of questions about the definition 
and potential transformative effects of single-sex education for girls. 
Elizabeth Peel and Hannah Newman continue the work of exploring the impact 
of decertification on a wide range of constituencies. In Gender’s wider stakes: Lay 
attitudes to legal gender reform, they analyse the project’s Attitudes to Legal Gender 
survey, which ran from October to December 2018, resulting in over 3,000 responses. 
Whilst there is now a very established and vibrant field of feminist legal research in 
Britain, social attitudes to legal gender are under-researched, as Peel and Newman point 
out. In their analysis of the survey data, they trace people’s everyday experiences and 
understandings of gender, legal gender status, and thoughts about reform. Peel and 
Newman adopt interpretive frameworks of cisgenderism and endosexism as routes into 
their analysis of the data to provide a social model for understanding people’s gender 
attitudes. Cisgenderism refers to ideological accounts that understand gender as binary, 
where lived gender is assumed to align with the gender assigned at birth. Endosexism 
refers to approaches to gender that erase the lived experiences of intersex people. 
These concepts provide touch points for Peel and Newman as they tease out the 
implications for law reform of layered, complex understandings and articulations of 
gender. 
In the fourth article – Taking public responsibility for gender: When personal 
identity and institutional feminist politics meet, Davina Cooper explores the challenge 
that soft decertification poses. In soft (or de facto) decertification, sex/ gender 
continues to be legally registered, assigned and confirmed by the state, but public and 
other bodies act as if it were otherwise. While this could mean treating sex/ gender as if 
it was no longer a salient feature of personhood, the emerging tendency has been to 
treat gender as if it was anchored in other authoring or identification processes. As 
glimpses of de facto decertification emerge, this article explores its implications for 






equality initiatives hitherto focused on addressing the asymmetrically patterned lives of 
women and men. It considers new ways of understanding gender that are coming to the 
fore, and the challenges that arise for bodies engaged in equality governance in trying to 
address them. At the heart of the discussion is the question of responsibility - the 
ethical, political, and legal obligation to pay attention or respond, that is anchored in 
different bodies’ capacity to undo or ameliorate social inequality and injustice. What 
does responsibility for gender entail when gender is treated as both institutionalised 
and self-determined; public and private? Cooper focuses on two contexts where 
contemporary equality governance in Britain addresses gender as a site of remaking 
and unmaking. The first concerns the front-stage initiatives and policies of public sector 
provision; the second concerns the back-stage scenes of organisational action, where 
informal decision-making arises. In both cases, taking responsibility for gender is far 
from straight-forward; yet, the essay argues for the importance of doing so. This is not 
just despite, but because of, the complex conditions that responsibility must grapple 
with when institutional gendered forms also exist as individual attachments. 
The final article in this special issue, Exploring the textual alchemy of legal 
gender: Experimental statutes and the message in the medium turns to the challenge of 
engaging with decertification as a feminist law reform project. One of the aims of the 
FLaG project is to produce an experimental statute decertifying gender in the law of 
England & Wales. To this end, Emily Grabham focuses on the conceptual and discursive 
power of statutory text, tracing its complex co-articulation with changing gender norms. 
The article draws on empirical research – including interviews with legislative drafters, 
drafting experts, and feminist legal activists - to explore the politics of writing an 
experimental feminist statute to decertify gender. Grabham explores how apparently 
timeless expressions of sex/gender in statutes have shifted in response to social change 
and legal innovation. She also argues that the method matters: the act of writing an 
experimental statute pulls feminists into relationships, norms, professional debates, and 
epistemologies of expertise and governance around legislative drafting that are likely to 
fundamentally affect what we think is possible and what we can achieve. Yet this can 
also help feminist scholars harness the power and potential of prefigurative feminist 
thinking.  







Taken together, these five articles and the ten commentaries that accompany 
them convey something of the rich and complicated topology that decertification 
entails. Typically, law reform projects start with a problem and then seek to identify the 
best solution; this research inverts the process – starting with one possible legal 
response to the problem of gender inequality in order to explore what its questioning 
and examination uncover and illuminate. Whether decertification is desirable, from a 
feminist perspective, as a reform that would help to diminish gender’s social 
significance and force as a mode of hierarchical ordering remains an open question. 
What also remains an open question, and one increasingly important for this research, 
are the other legal, political and welfare developments that would need to accompany 
or precede decertification. By problematising the normalised status accorded legal sex/ 
gender, and researching one mechanism for undoing this status, we seek to contribute 
to the body of work that critically explores what gender means, the many ways it is 
enacted and changes, and law’s place and role in maintaining and transforming 
gendered norms and practices. The articles, and responses from our discussants, 
identify some of the analytical threads we are exploring. We make them public, at this 
mid-stage of our project, and welcome further and wider discussion – read on, and 
enjoy. 
